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ABSTRACT
Deidentification is one method for protecting privacy while
permitting other uses of personal information.
However,
deidentified data is often still capable of being reidentified. The
main purpose of this article is to offer a legislative-based
contractual solution for the sharing of deidentified personal
information while providing protections for privacy.
The
legislative framework allows a data discloser and a data recipient
to enter into a voluntary contract that defines responsibilities and
offers remedies to aggrieved individuals.
INTRODUCTION
The goal of protecting the privacy interests of individuals often
conflicts with ever-increasing demands for use of personal data to
achieve potentially beneficial objectives in public health, law
A PDF version of this Note is available online at http://iplj.net/blog/archives/
volumexxi/book1. Visit http://iplj.net/blog/archives for access to the IPLJ archive.
*
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enforcement, national security, anti-terrorism, fraud prevention,
and research in different fields of study.1 Conflicts over privacy
can be reduced, moderated, and balanced in various ways.
Deidentification—the removal of identifiers from personal
information used or disclosed for purposes unrelated to the purpose
for which the information was originally obtained2—is one method
for protecting privacy while permitting other uses of personal
information.3 However, deidentification does not always make
reidentification of individuals impossible.4 Reidentification is the
linkage of deidentified personal information with an overt
identifier which belongs or is assigned to a living or dead
individual.5
This article begins with the premise that statistical, encryption,
or other mathematical approaches to deidentification aimed at
protecting privacy6 fail to provide solutions to address all data
types and data sharing activities.7 These approaches still have
value because they provide some degree of privacy protection, but
they seldom achieve complete deidentification of data.8 No matter
how many identifiers have been removed or encrypted and no
matter how much data has been coded or masked, the remaining

1
Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of
Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1704 (2010) (“Data can be either useful or
perfectly anonymous but never both.”).
2
See Re-identification, ELEC. INFO. PRIVACY CTR., http://epic.org/privacy/
reidentification/#intro (last visited Oct. 28, 2010).
3
See id.
4
See id.
5
See id.
6
Latanya Sweeney, Lab. for Computer Sci., Mass. Inst. of Tech., Roundtable
Discussion: Identifiability of Data at Subcomm. on Privacy & Confidentiality, Nat’l
Comm. on Vital & Health Statistics (Jan. 28, 1998), [hereinafter Sweeny, Subcomm.],
available at http://ncvhs.hhs.gov/980128tr.htm. The National Committee on Vital and
Health Statistics is an advisory committee to the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services. Id.
7
See Arvind Narayanan & Vitaly Shmatikov, Myths and Fallacies of “Personally
Identifiable Information,” 53 COMMC’N ACM 24, 26 (June 2010), available at
http://userweb.cs.utexas.edu/users/shmat/shmat_cacm10.pdf.
8
See id.
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data may still be reidentified.9 Further, the value of data for
legitimate uses, such as research, may be significantly reduced
when the data is processed without identifiers which were removed
to protect privacy.10 In the absence of a technical solution to
reidentification, other approaches are needed.
The solution presented here focuses on controlling
reidentification and providing accountability for those who
promise not to reidentify information. This article offers a
legislative-based contractual solution for the sharing of
deidentified personal information while providing protections for
privacy. This legislative framework allows a data discloser and a
data recipient to enter into a voluntary contract that defines
responsibilities and offers remedies to aggrieved individuals.
Additionally, this legislative approach offers (a) common
standards, (b) protections for the data subjects which are likely
never to appear in private contracts, (c) a framework that can be
incorporated by reference in regulations, and (d) a safe harbor
provision for some activities of reidentification. The proposed
contractual solution can be useful whether personal information is
deidentified in support of academic research or other objectives.
This proposal is not a universal guarantee of privacy, nor will it
work for all data exchanges. It will, however, provide another tool
to support the sharing of personal data while addressing the
privacy interests of the data subjects.
In this article, deidentification means that personal information
has been processed in some fashion to reduce the ability to identify
the individuals to whom the data refer. It does not mean that
information has been anonymized to the point where
reidentification is never possible.

9

See id. (“It turns out there is a wide spectrum of human characteristics that enable
re-identification: consumption preferences, commercial transactions, Web browsing,
search histories, and so forth.”); see also Ohm, supra note 1, at 1704–05.
10
See Ohm, supra note 1, at 1753. “[E]ven modest privacy gains require almost
complete destruction of the data-mining utility.” Id. (quoting Justin Brickell & Vitaly
Shmatikov, The Cost of Privacy: Destruction of Data-Mining Utility in Anonymized Data
Publishing, The 14th ACM SIGKDD Int’l Conference on Knowledge Discovery & Data
Mining 70, 70, 76 (August 2008)).
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I. THE PROBLEM
A major challenge for deidentification is the vast amount of
personal information available from public and private sources in
the United States and, increasingly, elsewhere around the world.11
The more personal data that is available, the easier it can be to link
deidentified data to a particular individual.12 The commercial
collection, compilation, and exploitation of personal data in the
United States are extensive.13 Sources of personal information
include public records (e.g., voter registers, occupational licenses,
property ownership and tax records, court records), commercial
data (e.g., transaction information), and even nonidentifiable data
(e.g., census data).14 Extensive profiles of individuals and
households exist in commercial records that may include the name,
address, former addresses, and telephone number of a referenced
individual as well as information pertaining to her educational
level, home ownership, mail order buying propensity, credit card
usage, income level, marital status, age, children, and lifestyle
(including personal interests in activities such as gardening or
sports).15 Private Internet companies increasingly maintain health
records outside the reach of health privacy laws that only protect
health records held by health care providers and insurers.16
Internet websites, including social networking sites, are recent new
facilities that provide additional sources of personal information,
11

See Narayanan & Shmatikov, supra note 7, at 24.
See Latanya Sweeney, Achieving k-Anonymity Privacy Protection Using
Generalization and Suppression, 10(5) INT’L J. ON UNCERTAINTY, FUZZINESS &
KNOWLEDGE-BASED SYS. 571, 588 (2002) [hereinafter Sweeney, Achieving k-Anonymity],
available at http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.58.7384&rep
=rep1&type=pdf (discussing how the increase in publically available information on the
internet has created the ability to build an “electronic fingerprint”).
13
See Latanya Sweeney, Information Explosion, in CONFIDENTIALITY, DISCLOSURE,
AND DATA ACCESS: THEORY AND PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS FOR STATISTICAL AGENCIES
43, 43 (P. Doyle et al. eds., Urban Inst. 2001).
14
See Latanya Sweeney, Computational Disclosure Control 110 (Jan. 8, 2001)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Mass. Inst. of Tech.), http://groups.csail.mit.
edu/mac/classes/6.805/articles/privacy/sweeney-thesis-draft.pdf [hereinafter Sweeney,
CDC].
15
See id.
16
See Robert Gellman, Personal Health Records: Why Many PHRs Threaten Privacy,
WORLD PRIVACY FORUM (Feb. 20, 2008), http://www.worldprivacyforum.org/
pdf/WPF_PHR_02_20_2008fs.pdf.
12
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including search requests, movies watched, and other activities and
interests.17 Cellular telephones now track the location of users at
all times.18 So-called “digital signage” tracks individuals in public
spaces, collecting detailed information about consumers’ behavior
and their characteristics, like age, gender, and ethnicity.19
Personal information that no longer contains overt identifiers
(name, identification number, e-mail address, telephone number)
can still be linked with known individuals. Identity can be
ascertained from simple, basic, widely available non-unique
identifiers (sometimes called quasi-identifiers).20 For example,
Professor Latanya Sweeney, a leading academic authority on
statistics, identification, and policy, estimates that 87% of
Americans can be uniquely identified from their date of birth,
gender, and five-digit zip code.21 Removing, generalizing, or
coding these or other non-unique identifiers may make the task of
reidentification harder, but the data may still be reidentified.22 At
the same time, deidentified data sets may be less useful for
research and other uses because of the difficulty of linking data
sets or because the data will no longer support complete or precise
conclusions.23
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(“HIPAA”), a federal health privacy statute, provides an example
of the difficulty of achieving—or even defining—

17

See, e.g., J.R. Raphael, People Search Engines: They Know Your Dark Secrets . . .
And Tell Anyone, PC WORLD (Mar. 10, 2009, 11:30 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/
article/161018/people_search_engines_they_know_your_dark_secretsand_tell_anyone.
html.
18
See April A. Otterberg, GPS Tracking Technology, 46 B.C. L. REV. 661, 662 (2005)
(discussing the privacy implications of GPS tracking).
19
See Pam Dixon, The One-Way-Mirror Society: Privacy Implications of the New
Digital Signage Networks, WORLD PRIVACY FORUM (Jan. 27, 2010), http://www.
worldprivacyforum.org/pdf/onewaymirrorsocietyfs.pdf.
20
See R. Motwani & Y. Xu, Efficient Algorithms for Masking and Finding QuasiIdentifiers, Very Large Data Bases (VLDB) Conference, Vienna, Austria (2007).
21
Sweeney, CDC, supra note 14, at 20.
22
See id. at 203 (discussing how the Scrubs Method of de-anonymizing data cannot
guarantee that data will not be reidentified).
23
See Sweeney, Achieving k-Anonymity, supra note 12, at 573 (explaining that
information, though de-identified, must remain practically useful as research material).
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deidentification.24
HIPAA’s privacy rule provides that
individually identifiable health information is deidentified if
seventeen specific fields of data are removed or generalized.25 The
rule assumed that deidentification by this method would provide
complete anonymity to the individuals concerned. Data that is
deidentified according to this standard falls outside the rule’s
scope, and the rule allows the data to be freely disclosed to anyone
or to be published.26
However, notwithstanding HIPAA’s determination that the
resulting data is deidentified, Professor Sweeney testified that there
is a 0.04% chance that data deidentified under the health Act’s
methodology could be reidentified when the deidentified data was
compared to voter registration records for a confined population.27
Thus, if a database deidentified under HIPAA standards had one
million names, then four hundred people could likely be
reidentified. If other public, commercially available, Internetbased, or private records were also to be consulted, the chances of
reidentification would almost certainly increase.
HIPAA’s
deidentification process may be the most specific and detailed
regulatory approach to deidentification. Yet, even HIPAA’s
extensive and carefully considered efforts at deidentification do not
achieve complete anonymity for all data.
Other examples in which information was reidentified after it
was processed to protect privacy information can be readily found.
24

See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2
(2006). HIPAA rules cover both privacy and security. See HHS Security and Privacy
Rule, 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2) (2010) (detailing the requirements relating to use and
disclosure of health information).
25
45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2)(i) (2010). The rule has an eighteenth, catch-all, field
covering “[a]ny other unique identifying number, characteristic, or code.” Id. §
164.514(b)(2)(i)(R). In addition to removing the specified identifiers, the entity making
the disclosure cannot have actual knowledge that the information “could be used alone or
in combination with other information to identify an individual who is a subject of the
information.” Id. § 164.514(b)(2)(ii) (2010).
26
See NAT’L COMM. ON VITAL & HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVS., ENHANCED PROTECTIONS FOR USES OF HEALTH DATA: A STEWARDSHIP
FRAMEWORK FOR “SECONDARY USES” OF ELECTRONICALLY COLLECTED AND
TRANSMITTED HEALTH DATA 36 (2007), available at http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/
071221lt.pdf.
27
Id. at 36 n.16.
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Professors Krish Muralidhar and Rathindra Sarathy provide a case
study using educational performance data publicly released by
states under federal rules.28 The disclosures are supposed to
comply with a requirement in the Family Educational Rights and
Privacy Act of 1974 (“FERPA”) that the disclosure of identifiable
student data requires written parental consent.29 Muralidhar and
Sarathy show that even when the release of aggregate data
satisfies standards for minimum cell sizes, the remaining data can
still allow for the computation of personally identifiable
information about particular subgroups and about individuals.30
A June 2010 article by Arvind Narayanan and Vitaly
Shmatikov noted the shortcomings of deidentification and offered
a broad and general conclusion: “[t]he emergence of powerful reidentification algorithms demonstrates not just a flaw in a specific
anonymization technique(s), but the fundamental inadequacy of the
entire privacy protection paradigm based on ‘de-identifying’ the
data.”31
Professor Paul Ohm suggests that “[u]ntil a decade ago, the
robust anonymization assumption worked well for everybody
involved.”32 He provides additional examples of several wellpublicized releases of supposedly deidentified data that were
ultimately found to be identifiable, including the America Online
release of research data search queries and the Netflix release of a
prize data study that contained 100 million movie ratings by
Netflix customers.33
Indeed, there may not be a realistic and practical standard for
absolute deidentification in today’s data rich world. Professor
Sweeney put it this way: “I can never guarantee that any release of
[deidentified] data is anonymous, even though for a particular user

28

Krish Muralidhar & Rathindra Sarathy, PRIVACY VIOLATIONS IN ACCOUNTABILITY
DATA RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC BY STATE EDUCATIONAL AGENCIES 1 (2009), available at
http://gatton.uky.edu/faculty/muralidhar/EdPrivacyViolation.pdf.
29
20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b) (2006).
30
See Muralidhar & Sarathy, supra note 28, at 7–20.
31
Narayanan & Shmatikov, supra note 7, at 26.
32
Ohm, supra note 1, at 1716.
33
Id. at 1720–24.
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it may very well be anonymous.”34 As a general proposition, for
most personal data, deidentification may be like absolute zero for
temperature: a state that can be approached but never achieved.
Even if data could be fully deidentified, the prize may not be worth
the effort in many cases. The data may no longer have significant
value for researchers and other users.35
From a policy perspective, identifiability of personal
information is best viewed as a continuum. At one end of the
continuum, information is fully identifiable due to the presence of
names, identification numbers, and the like. Shedding overt
identifiers moves data down the continuum where it becomes
harder to link the data with individuals, but data may still be
identifiable even with all overt identifiers removed. While it may
be possible at times to achieve provably absolute deidentification
using encryption, coding, hashing, and other techniques,36 it seems
highly unlikely that there is a general solution that will work for all
types of data, all types of users, and all types of activities. Thus,
we continue to face the possibility that deidentified personal data
shared for research and other purposes may be subject to
reidentification.
II. EXISTING LEGAL APPROACHES
Statisticians have long been aware of deidentification issues
and have developed many techniques to address the possibility of
reidentification.37 However, existing laws do little to untangle the
deidentification dilemma. Indeed, they tend to make it worse.
Existing laws often reflect an assumption that identifiability is a
binary state; personal data is either identifiable or it is not. These
34

See Sweeney, Subcomm., supra note 6.
See Ohm, supra note 1, at 1704.
36
See Sweeney, Subcomm., supra note 6.
37
See, e.g., Fed. Comm. on Statistical Methodology, Report on Statistical Disclosure
Limitation Methodology 12–28 (Statistical Policy Working Paper No. 22, 2005),
available at http://www.fcsm.gov/working-papers/spwp22.html (discussing sampling,
suppression random rounding, and swapping as examples of methods for
deidentification); Khaled El Emam, Heuristics for De-identifying Health Data, 6 IEEE
SEC. & PRIVACY 58–61 (2008) (discussing heuristics that are used and how they can be
applied).
35
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laws tend to ignore the reidentification issue altogether,
establishing vague or inconsistent standards for identifiability.
Some examples:
 The Privacy Act of 1974,38 a U.S. law that
applies mostly to federal agencies, defines
“record” as a grouping of information about an
individual that contains “his name, or the
identifying number, symbol, or other identifying
particular assigned to the individual, such as a
finger or voice print or a photograph.”39 An
identifier is an essential part of a record.40 The
ability to infer identity or to reidentify a record
is not sufficient or relevant, no matter how easy
it may be to accomplish the reidentification.
Further, the law treats a fingerprint as an
identifier,41 when few people without access to a
law enforcement fingerprint database could
identify an individual from a fingerprint. The
Act’s concept of identifiability is muddled, at
best.


38

The Cable Communications Policy Act does not
define “personally identifiable information,” but
it excludes from the term “any record of
aggregate data which does not identify
particular persons.”42 However, even aggregate
data can be used to reidentify individuals in
some circumstances.43 The statute does not
address that possibility.

5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006).
Id.
40
See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(4) (referring to examples of identifiers such as name,
identifying number, symbol, etc.).
41
See id.
42
47 U.S.C. § 551(a)(2)(A).
43
See Muralidhar & Sarathy, supra note 28, at 7–20 (discussing how the disclosure of
personally identifiable information results from the release of aggregate data regarding
individual education performance).
39
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The Confidential Information Protection and
Statistical Efficiency Act of 2002 (“CIPSEA”)
defines
“identifiable
form”
as
“any
representation of information that permits the
identity of the respondent to whom the
information applies to be reasonably inferred by
either direct or indirect means.”44 CIPSEA’s
definition is one of the few that explicitly
addresses the use of indirect inferences to
permit identification,45 but it does not indicate
the scope of effort that is necessary to render
deidentified data identifiable.
Further
explication would presumably require parsing
the meaning of “reasonably.”



Canada’s Personal Information Protection and
Electronic Documents Act (“PIPEDA”) defines
“personal information” as “information about an
identifiable individual.”46 Thus, PIPEDA offers
no standard for determining identifiability or
anonymity, nor does it address the issue of
reidentification. A treatise on PIPEDA suggests
that truly anonymous information does not
qualify for protection under the statute.47 It also
suggests that “caution should be exercised in
determining what is truly ‘anonymous’
information since the availability of external

Confidential Information Protection and Statistical Efficiency Act (CIPSEA) of
2002, 44 U.S.C. § 3501.
45
Compare The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, and Personal Information
Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c. 5, § 2(1) (Can.), available at
http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/sc-2000-c-5/latest/sc-2000-c-5.html
(defining
“personal information” without explicitly addressing information that indirectly permits
personal identification), with Confidential Information Protection and Statistical
Efficiency Act of 2002, 44 U.S.C. § 3501.
46
Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c. 5, §
2(1) (Can.), available at http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/sc-2000-c-5/latest/sc-2000c-5.html.
47
STEPHANIE PERRIN, ET AL., THE PERSONAL INFORMATION PROTECTION AND
ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS ACT: AN ANNOTATED GUIDE (2001).
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information in automated format may facilitate
the reidentification of information that has been
made anonymous.”48 That advice may be
helpful, but the statute itself is silent.


48

The European Union (“E.U.”) Data Protection
Directive defines “personal data” as “any
information relating to an identified or
identifiable natural person,” and it defines an
identifiable person as “an individual person . . .
who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in
particular by reference to an identification
number or to one or more factors specific to his
physical, physiological, mental, economic,
cultural or social identity.”49 The task of
parsing these words for a clear standard is
helped
somewhat
by
the
Directive’s
Introductory Recital 26, which states that
privacy rules will not apply to “data rendered
anonymous in such a way that the data subject is
no longer identifiable.”50 It also provides that
“to determine whether a person is identifiable,
account should be taken of all the means likely
reasonably to be used either by the controller or
by any other person to identify the said
person.”51 Based on the Recital, it seems
apparent that the Directive uses a
reasonableness standard to determine whether
information is sufficiently deidentified to fall
outside the Directive’s ambit.

Id. at 54.
Council Directive 95/46, art. 2, Directive on the Protection of Individuals with
Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995
O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?
uri= CELEX:31995L0046:en:HTML.
50
Id. at Recital 26.
51
Id.
49
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A further gloss on the Directive’s meaning of
“personal data” can be found in an opinion of
the Article 29 Working Party, an organization
established under the Directive.52 The opinion
offers twenty-six pages of detailed and
interesting explanation of how to establish what
is and is not personal data, and what is and is
not identifiable.53 The length of the analysis is
evidence of the complexity of identifiability
under current conditions. The Working Party’s
conclusion that a determination of anonymity
depends on the circumstances and calls for a
case-by-case analysis is further evidence of the
essential murkiness of the identifiability
concept.54


The Alberta Health Information Act defines
“individually identifying” to mean when a data
subject “can be readily ascertained from the
information,”55 and it defines “non-identifying”
to mean that the identity of the data subject
“cannot be readily ascertained from the
information.”56 This appears to limit the
identifiability inquiry to the information itself.
Alberta’s data matching law57 regulates the
creation of individually identifying health
information
by
combining
individually
identifying
or
non-identifying
health
information or other information from two or

52
See id. at Art. 29 (establishing the Working Party as an independent, advisory
committee with representatives from each state and the European Union).
53
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 4/2007 on the Concept of
Personal Data, 01248/07/EN WP 136 (June 20, 2007), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2007/wp136_en.pdf.
54
See id. at 21.
55
Health Information Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. H-5 § 1(p) (Can.), available at http://www.
qp.alberta.ca/574.cfm?page=H05.cfm&leg_type=Acts&isbncln=9780779739493.
56
Id. § 1(r).
57
Id. § 68.
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more electronic databases without the consent of
the data subjects.58
The data matching
requirements include submission of a privacy
impact assessment to the commissioner for
review and comment.59
The Alberta law
expressly addresses reidentification activities by
anyone (at least, anyone using an electronic
database).60
The Act establishes an
administrative process rather than a statutory
standard for determining whether identifiable
information is at stake.
In general, statutes and rules that address identifiability and
deidentification can be grouped roughly into three categories.61
The first category includes standards that seek to determine
whether data is sufficiently or potentially identifiable to warrant
regulation. The standards can (a) be inward-looking (considering
only the data);62 (b) be outward-looking (considering other data
actually or potentially available elsewhere as well as the
capabilities for reidentification generally available to individuals or
experts);63 (c) require professional statistical judgment;64 or (d)
consider the time, effort, or cost required for reidentification.65
More than one of these standards can apply at the same time. A
standard can also reference a reasonableness test, either directly or
indirectly.66 As is apparent, a multiplicity of standards are
available in this category.67

58

Id. § 1(g).
Id. §§ 70(3), 71(3).
60
See id. at § 1(g) (limiting scope of data matching provisions to combinations of
electronic databases).
61
See Robert Gellman, Privacy for Research Data, PUTTING PEOPLE ON THE MAP:
PROTECTING CONFIDENTIALITY WITH LINKED SOCIAL-SPATIAL DATA 81, 92 (Nat’l
Research Council ed., 2007), available at http://books.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=
11865 (reviewing privacy laws in Australia, Britain, Canada, Europe, and the U.S.).
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 88–89. The European Union Data Protection Directive is an example of a
statute that employs an explicit reasonableness test. See supra notes 49–52 and
accompanying text. The British Data Protection Act incorporates a reasonableness test
59
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The second category uses an administrative process. The
Alberta law calls for administrative privacy review in advance of
some reidentification activities.68 This type of review may be
possible in a small jurisdiction, but it would be impractical in a
larger one.
The third category is a rule that requires the removal of
specified data elements. HIPAA’s health privacy rule is a leading
example.69
Some of its shortcomings have already been
70
discussed.
This limited review of statutes and rules suggests the wide
variance in identifiability standards that can be found. In most
cases, the statutes offer alternate word formulas71 that are probably
casually drafted rather than a carefully considered approach based
on detailed study or analysis. Recognition by legislators and
policy makers of the complexities presented by deidentification of
personal data has been slow to develop. Laws badly trail the
capabilities of modern computers and experts to use the vast pools
of personal data available today.72 Current technology allows for
the reidentification of data that most casual observers would have
thought was adequately deidentified.73
All existing regulatory approaches suffer from shortcomings.74
HIPAA’s rule provides greater certainty, but that certainty is
somewhat misplaced.75
CIPSEA expressly recognizes the
possibility of reidentification, but it offers little practical
guidance.76 It might well take years of litigation before any useful
test emerges, and the result of litigation may not provide enough

implicitly. See UK Data Protection Act, 1998 c. 29, § 1(1), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/29/contents.
67
See Gellman, supra note 61, at 92.
68
See id.; see also Health Information Act, R.S.A. 2000, ch. H-5 §§ 68–72 (Can.).
69
See 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2)(i) (2010).
70
See supra pp. 37–38.
71
See Gellman, supra note 61, at 92.
72
Ohm, supra note 1, at 1706 (“[P]owerful advances in reidentification thwart the
aims of nearly every privacy law and regulation.”).
73
See supra notes 9, 22 and accompanying text.
74
Ohm, supra note 1, at 1706.
75
See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
76
See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text.
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clarity. The Alberta administrative process likely will not scale to
larger jurisdictions or will require a cumbersome bureaucracy.77
III. CONTRACTUAL SOLUTION
No legislation can establish meaningful standards for the
creation of deidentified data that has full value for legitimate
secondary users. That objective cannot be reached now and may
be impossible to achieve generally. There will always be a
tradeoff of some sort, involving the degree of identifiability of the
data, the usability of the data, the privacy of the data subjects, and
the cost of the deidentification process.78 Technology can
sometimes lessen these tradeoffs, but it cannot eliminate them all
the time.79
What legislation can do, however, is establish a statutory
framework that will allow the data disclosers and the data
recipients to agree voluntarily on externally enforceable terms that
provide privacy protections for the data subjects. An ordinary
contract or exchange of data is not likely to consider or give effect
to the rights of the data subjects, who are rarely if ever parties to
the transaction.80 The proposed statute defines the terms of data
disclosure and rights for the data subjects. The effect is to strike a
balance between the interests of all parties: the data disclosers, the
data users, and the data subjects. That is the main purpose of the

77

See supra note 57–60 and accompanying text. But see infra Appendix, Personal
Data Deidentification Act (“PDDA”). The Alberta law requires the submission of a
privacy impact assessment to the commissioner for review and comment, which is
probably only feasible in a smaller jurisdiction because of the level of review required.
See Health Information Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. H-5 § 70(2). The PDDA is probably better
suited to a larger jurisdiction than the Alberta law because it does not require
administrative review prior to reidentification. See generally infra Appendix, Personal
Data Deidentification Act.
78
See Ohm, supra note 1, at 1751–52 (noting that as data utility increases, privacy
protection decreases, and technology has yet to eliminate this tradeoff).
79
See id.
80
See Gellman, supra note 61, at 110. Since the parties to a data agreement are the
data discloser and the data recipient, a data subject has difficulty suing for breach of
contract due to a lack of privity. However, a data subject may escape the problem of lack
of privity in some jurisdictions by suing as a third party beneficiary. See id.; see also
infra notes 112–14 and accompanying text.
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law proposed here, the Personal Data Deidentification Act
(“PDDA”).81
The key definition in the PDDA is potentially identifiable
personal information (“PI2”). The definition of PI2 builds on a
definition of personal information, which is any information about
an individual, whether it contains a personal identifier or not.82
Potentially identifiable personal information is any personal
information without overt identifiers.83 PI2 is a new concept in the
PDDA, included to cover the wide range of personal information
without overt identifiers that is likely to be reidentifiable. Since it
cannot be known at any time whether information is
reidentifiable,84 virtually all personal information that is not
overtly identifiable is PI2. Aggregate data (as opposed to
microdata, which is data about an individual)85 is not expressly
addressed in the proposal, but the proposed contractual solution
could work just as well for aggregate data that includes the
possibility of reidentification.
The core proposal in the legislation is a voluntary data
agreement, which is a contract between a data discloser and a data
recipient.86 The PDDA will only apply to those who choose to
accept its terms and penalties through a data agreement.87 The
PDDA establishes standards for behavior and proposes civil and
criminal penalties for violations.88 The data recipients would be
prohibited from reidentifying or attempting to reidentify any
potentially identifiable personal information under the threat of

81

See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act, Preamble.
See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act §§ 2(6)–(7).
83
See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act § 2(7).
84
See Gellman, supra note 61, at 85 (“It may not always be easy to predict in advance
when deidentified data can be linked. . . . Whether a set of data is identifiable can depend
on the characteristics of the set itself, on factors wholly external to the set, or on the
identity of the observer.” (citation omitted)).
85
See Linked Social-Spatial Data: Promises and Challenges, in PUTTING PEOPLE ON
THE MAP: PROTECTING CONFIDENTIALITY WITH LINKED SOCIAL-SPATIAL DATA 7, 11
(Myron P. Guttman & Paul C. Stern, Nat’l Research Council eds., 2007).
86
See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act § 3.
87
See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act § 3(a).
88
See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act §§ 4–5, 7(a)–(b) (specifying
civil and criminal penalties).
82
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civil and criminal penalties.89 The data recipients would also be
required to maintain technical, administrative, and other safeguards
against reidentification.90 In exchange, there are benefits to the
discloser and recipient. Some disclosers would benefit from the
proposed safe harbor provision that offers liability protections to
those who apply the statute for research activities.91 Recipients
would benefit by being able to offer potential disclosers more
assurance that a data transfer will not create liabilities.92 The data
subjects would benefit from uniform rules, new protections, and
enforcement methods that are difficult or impossible to find
today.93
The proposal would not require all data disclosers and all data
users to comply with its requirements. Only those who voluntarily
choose to reference the PDDA in a contract or equivalent
document would be subject to its requirements.94 A mandatory
solution may not be practical. There appears to be no way to write
a definition that would encompass all data transfers, and there are
too many data transfers to expect that one size will fit all.95
A voluntary approach allows those who want the benefits to
accept the obligations. A model for this approach to legislation is
arbitration. Laws define, support, and provide for the enforcement
of arbitration agreements,96 but it is typical for the parties of a
contract to decide whether they want to make use of arbitration at
all.97 If they do not, then arbitration laws do not affect their
activities.98

89

See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act §§ 4(1), 7.
See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act § 4.
91
See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act § 6.
92
See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act § 6.
93
See Gellman, supra note 61, at 110; see also supra Part II.
94
See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act § 3(a).
95
See supra notes 38–60 and accompanying text.
96
See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
97
See, e.g., Ass’n of Am. R.Rs. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 162 F.3d 101, 111 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (“It cannot be gainsaid that the submission of a dispute to arbitration is normally a
voluntary act, either at the time of the dispute or at an earlier time in a contract providing
for such arbitration.”).
98
See id.
90
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The discloser who shares data under a data agreement proceeds
with the knowledge that the recipient has accepted strict limits on
the data’s use and disclosure, and that these restrictions are
enforceable by the state and by the data subjects.99 The discloser
does not have to accept any obligation to police the agreement or
to act on behalf of the data subjects, other than to report breaches
of the agreement to a government agency.100 The main benefit to
the discloser is that criminal liability is capped or eliminated by the
law.101 Further, the proposal includes a formal safe harbor
provision, which exempts a discloser from liability for disclosure
under a data agreement if (1) the recipient is a government agency,
non-profit organization, or research organization that has not
reported a breach of a data agreement in the five years prior to date
of the agreement,102 and (2) the disclosure is for use in research
(“systematic investigation designed to develop or contribute to
generalizable knowledge, but does not include marketing
research”)103 or in a public health activity.104 The purpose of the
safe harbor provision is to provide encouragement for data sharing
for beneficial purposes.
The recipient who seeks data under a data agreement is in a
better position to ask for data from a discloser because the data
agreement and the law impose on the recipient defined and
enforceable limits that protect the privacy of the data subjects.105
A reluctant source might be encouraged by a would-be recipient to
share data because of the existence of formal standards and limited
liability.106 The recipient accepts the limits and the liability as a
condition of receiving the data.107
The data subject benefits from disclosure under a data
agreement because of strong rules prohibiting conduct that could

99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107

See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act § 4.
See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act § 5.
See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act § 7(b).
See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act § 6(a)(1).
See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act § 2(10).
See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act § 6(a)(2).
See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act § 4.
See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act § 4.
See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act § 3(a).
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reidentify data.108 The data subject also benefits because the law
clarifies that the data subject is a third party beneficiary of the data
agreement.109 This enables an aggrieved data subject to seek
damages from a negligent party to the data agreement.110 Under
current law, a data subject may be unable to sue relying upon an
ordinary contract between a data discloser and a data recipient
because the data subject is not a party to the contract.111 “The data
subject lacks privity–an adequate legal relationship–to the contract
and cannot use the contract to enforce his or her interest.”112
Today, only in some jurisdictions will the data subject be
recognized as a third party beneficiary of a data use agreement and
be able to seek damages.113 In general, however, the requirement
for privity can be a major obstacle to enforcement of privacy rights
by the data subjects.114 The proposed law would clarify this issue
in favor of the data subjects.
Most of the obligations fall on the data recipient, which is
appropriate because the recipient obtains new data vulnerable to
reidentification. The recipient agrees to:
1) not reidentify or attempt to reidentify any
potentially identifiable personal information
received under [a] data agreement;
2) take reasonable steps . . . to prevent any . . .
related party from reidentifying or making an
attempt to reidentify any potentially identifiable
personal information . . . received under that data
agreement;

108

See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act § 4.
See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act § 8(a).
110
See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act § 8(b).
111
See Joel Reidenberg, The Privacy Obstacle Course: Hurdling Barriers to
Transnational Financial Services, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. S137, S175 (1992) (citing Brian
Napier, Contractual Solutions to the Problem of Equivalent Data Protection in
Transborder Data Flows, Presentation at Conference on Legal Challenges and
Opportunities Created by the Prolific Growth of Electronic Information Services (Mar.
27–28, 1990) (paper on file with the Fordham Law Review)).
112
Gellman, supra note 61, at 110; see also Reidenberg, supra note 111, at S175.
113
See Gellman, supra note 61, at 110.
114
See id.
109
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3) not further use or disclose any potentially
identifiable personal information received under
that data agreement except in accordance with that
data agreement;
4) only disclose potentially identifiable personal
information received under that data agreement to
another person if the disclosure is allowed by that
data agreement and if the disclosure is made
pursuant to that data agreement or another data
agreement subject to [the] Act;
5) maintain reasonable physical, administrative, and
technical
safeguards
to
protect
against
reidentification of potentially identifiable personal
information received under that data agreement;
6) inform a potential discloser in writing before
entering into any data agreement . . . of any actual
or reasonably likely breaches of other data
agreements . . . that the recipient entered into during
the past 10 years.115
The last requirement provides a self-policing mechanism that
obliges bad actors to tell others before they can obtain new data.116
The fourth requirement—that data received under a data use
agreement only be redisclosed under the original data agreement or
under a new data agreement subject to the Act—means that there
must be a chain of trust if data is further disclosed.117 The data
involved in a data use agreement will always be subject to the
mandated protections.118 If allowed by the original data use
agreement, the data recipient can become a data discloser with
respect to the next recipient, and the protections continue in force
because a new data use agreement is required.119
Both the recipient and the discloser must: (1) report any breach
of a data agreement that the recipient entered into to a national

115
116
117
118
119

See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act §§ 4(1)–(6).
See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act § 4(7).
See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act § 4(4).
See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act § 3(a)(1).
See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act § 4(4).
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consumer protection/privacy agency and to each other;120 (2)
publish a notice of the breach prominently on their respective
public websites;121 and (3) maintain the website notice for two
years.122 In addition, in the event that either party learns that
potentially identifiable personal information under their data
agreement has been reidentified, that party must comply with
applicable security breach notification laws.123 The proposed law
does not impose a security breach notification obligation of its
own. It references existing obligations.124 It can be anticipated
that parties to a data agreement will allocate responsibility for
compliance with breach notification laws among themselves in
some suitable manner.
The PDDA includes several carefully tiered criminal penalties
for violations. The penalties range from civil penalties for failure
to report or failure to post,125 to felonies for knowing and willful
reidentification or attempted reidentification,126 to major felonies
with the possibility of imprisonment for knowing and willful
reidentification or attempted reidentification with the intent to sell,
transfer, or use personal information for commercial advantage,
personal gain, or malicious harm.127 There is also a felony for
disclosing PI2 obtained under a data agreement subject to the Act
in violation of the terms of the agreement.128
Civil remedies are available to an individual whose PI2 has
been reidentified against a discloser or recipient who is negligently
responsible for the reidentification.129 The PDDA specifically
provides that a data subject is a third party beneficiary of a data
agreement so that there will be no issue about a lack of standing to
sue over the contract.130
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130

See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act §§ 4(7)(A), 5(1)(A).
See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act §§ 4(7)(B), 5(1)(B).
See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act §§ 4(7)(C), 5(1)(C).
See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act §§ 4(8), 5(2).
See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act §§ 4(8), 5(2).
See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act § 7(a).
See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act § 7(b)(2).
See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act § 7(b)(3).
See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act § 7(b)(1).
See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act § 8.
See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act § 8(a).
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Other provisions require an appropriate government agency
with oversight responsibilities for the Act to file a biennial report,
review the law in five years, and prepare model data agreements.131
Another provision makes it clear that the PDDA does not change,
override, or preempt any requirement or obligation established by
other laws, and does not exempt anyone from complying with
obligations under any law or rule for the protection of human
research subjects.132 Finally, the proposed legislation has been
drafted in a manner that is not directly tied to U.S. law.133 The
same approach might have value in other jurisdictions.
CONCLUSION
The proposed PDDA seeks to strike a balance between the
need to share deidentified personal information for research and
other purposes and the inability to guarantee that the information is
wholly deidentified. The solution is to allow the data disclosers
and the data recipients to enter into a voluntary data agreement that
defines the obligations of the parties, provides greater certainty
about the potential liabilities, and allows individual data subjects to
enforce their privacy interests when data has been reidentified.134
In order to support appropriate sharing, the legislation includes a
safe harbor provision for a data discloser who shares data for a
beneficial purpose.135
Today’s lack of clear definitions, deidentification procedures,
and legal certainty can impede some useful data sharing. It can
also affect the privacy of users when the lack of clarity about
deidentification results in sharing of identifiable data that could
have been avoided.
The proposed approach to the deidentification dilemma faced
by data processors and policy makers will not solve every problem
associated with personal data transfers and uses, but it will make
available a new tool that fairly balances the needs and interests of
131
132
133
134
135

See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act § 9.
See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act § 10.
See generally infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act.
See supra notes 86, 88–89 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 91, 102–04 and accompanying text.
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the data disclosers, the data users, and the data subjects. The
solution could be invoked voluntarily by the data disclosers and the
data recipients. Its use could also be mandated by regulation or
legislation seeking to allow broader use of personal data for
beneficial purposes.
APPENDIX
A BILL
To protect the privacy of potentially identifiable personal
information by establishing accountability for the use and transfer
of potentially identifiable personal information. [Version 4.4]
SECTION (“SEC.”) 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the “Personal Data Deidentification
Act.”
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
As used in this Act:
(1) D ATA AGREEMENT .—The term “data agreement” means a
contract, memorandum of understanding, data use agreement, or
similar agreement between a discloser and a recipient relating to
the use of personal information.
(2) D ATA AGREEMENT S UBJECT TO THIS A CT .—The term
“data agreement subject to this Act’’ means a data agreement
between a discloser and a recipient who have entered into an
agreement described in section 3(a).
(3) D ISCLOSER .—The term “discloser” means a person who
discloses potentially identifiable personal information to another
person pursuant to a data agreement subject to this Act.
(4) O VERT IDENTIFIER .—The term “overt identifier” means
any personal information that identifies or can readily be used to
identify a particular individual, and includes a name, address,
Social Security number, account number, license number, serial
number, telephone number, electronic mail address, Internet
protocol address, webpage address, or biometric, that alone or in
combination with other information identifies or can readily be
used to identify a particular individual.
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(5) P ERSON .—The term “person” means an individual,
corporation, company, foundation, association, society,
partnership, firm, non-profit organization, school, college, or
university, or a department, agency, or other instrumentality of
[Federal, State, or local] government.
(6) P ERSONAL INFORMATION .—The term “personal
information” means information about an individual that may or
may not include an overt identifier.
(7)
P OTENTIALLY
IDENTIFIABLE
PERSONAL
INFORMATION .—The term “potentially identifiable personal
information” means any personal information without any overt
identifiers.
(8) P UBLIC WEBSITE .—The term “public website” means a
facility by which a person displays information to the general
public on the Internet or any comparable successor technology.
(9) R ECIPIENT .—The term “recipient” means a person who
receives potentially identifiable personal information from another
person pursuant to a data agreement subject to this Act.
(10) R ESEARCH .—The term “research” means a systematic
investigation designed to develop or contribute to generalizable
knowledge, but does not include marketing research.
(11) R EIDENTIFICATION .—The term “reidentification” means
linking potentially identifiable personal information to an overt
identifier belonging or assigned to any living or dead individual.
SEC. 3. DATA AGREEMENTS.
(a) A GREEMENTS SUBJECT TO A CT .—A person who enters
into a data agreement that expressly references this Act by
including the words “This data agreement is subject to the Personal
Information Deidentification Procedures Act” or equivalent words,
or who is required to be subject to this Act by statute or regulation
for any disclosure or receipt of potentially identifiable personal
information
(1) shall be bound by, and subject to, all of the terms of this
Act with respect to potentially identifiable personal information
disclosed or received under that data agreement, statute, or
regulation; and
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(2) may not terminate, revoke, suspend, or otherwise limit or
restrict the application of this Act to potentially identifiable
personal information disclosed or received under that data
agreement, statute, or regulation.
(b) A DDITIONAL TERMS PERMITTED .—The parties to a data
agreement subject to this Act may include additional terms to that
data agreement that do not limit or undermine the terms required
by this Act.
SEC. 4. DUTIES OF RECIPIENT.
A recipient under a data agreement subject to this Act shall—
(1) not reidentify or attempt to reidentify any potentially
identifiable personal information received under that data
agreement;
(2) take reasonable steps, including contracts, technical
measures, or workplace rules, to prevent any employee, agent,
consultant, contractor, affiliate, subcontractor, or other related
party from reidentifying or making an attempt to reidentify any
potentially identifiable personal information that the recipient
received under that data agreement;
(3) not further use or disclose any potentially identifiable
personal information received under the data agreement except in
accordance with that data agreement;
(4) only disclose potentially identifiable personal information
received under that data agreement to another person if the
disclosure is allowed by that data agreement and if the disclosure is
made pursuant to that data agreement or another data agreement
subject to this Act;
(5) maintain reasonable physical, administrative, and technical
safeguards to protect against reidentification of potentially
identifiable personal information received under that data
agreement;
(6) inform a potential discloser in writing before entering into
any data agreement that will be a data agreement subject to this
Act with the potential discloser of any actual or reasonably likely
breaches of other data agreements subject to this Act that the
recipient entered into during the past 10 years;
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(7) (A) promptly report any breach of a data agreement subject
to this Act that the recipient entered into to—
(i) the [National Consumer Protection/Privacy Agency]; and
(ii) the discloser;
(B) promptly publish a notice of the breach prominently on the
recipient’s public website; and
(C) maintain the notice for two years; and
(8) in the event that the recipient learns that potentially
identifiable personal information that the recipient obtained under
that data agreement has been reidentified, comply with applicable
[Federal or State] security breach notification laws.
SEC. 5. DUTIES OF DISCLOSER.
A discloser under a data agreement subject to this Act shall—
(1) (A) promptly report any breach of that data agreement to
the [National Consumer Protection/Privacy Agency];
(B) promptly publish a notice of the breach prominently on the
discloser’s public website; and
(C) maintain the notice for two years;
(2) in the event that the discloser learns that any potentially
identifiable personal information that the discloser disclosed under
that data agreement has been reidentified, comply with applicable
[Federal or State] security breach notification laws; and
(3) in the event that the discloser learns that any potentially
identifiable personal information disclosed under that data
agreement has been reidentified or may have been reidentified,
immediately suspend further disclosures of potentially identifiable
personal information to the recipient under the data agreement.
SEC. 6. SAFE HARBOR.
A discloser who lawfully discloses potentially identifiable
personal information under a data agreement subject to this Act—
(1) to a recipient who is a government agency, non-profit
organization, or research organization that has not reported a
breach of a data agreement in the five years prior to the date of the
agreement,
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(2) for use in research or in a public health activity,
shall not be liable under this Act or any other law to an
individual who is the subject of potentially identifiable personal
information disclosed pursuant to that data agreement for any
damage resulting from that disclosure, except in the case of gross
negligence on the part of the discloser.
SEC. 7. PENALTIES.
(a) CIVIL PENALTIES.—A person who fails to report a breach of
a data agreement subject to this Act, or to post a notice in
accordance with this Act, shall be subject to a civil penalty of not
more than [$2,000] in an action brought by the [National
Consumer Protection/Privacy Agency][Attorney General].
(b) F ELONY OFFENSES .—
(1) A recipient, or any employee, agent, consultant, contractor,
affiliate, subcontractor, or other related party of a recipient, who
willfully discloses potentially identifiable personal information
received under a data agreement subject to this Act in violation of
this Act is guilty of a felony and shall be fined not more than [ ] or
imprisoned not more than [ ] years, or both.
(2) A recipient, or any employee, agent, consultant, contractor,
affiliate, subcontractor, or other related party of a recipient, who
willfully reidentifies or attempts to reidentify potentially
identifiable personal information received under a data agreement
subject to this Act in violation of this Act is guilty of a felony and
shall be fined not more than [ ] or imprisoned not more than [ ]
years, or both.
(3) A recipient, or any employee, agent, consultant, contractor,
affiliate, subcontractor, or other related party of a recipient, who
willfully reidentifies or attempts to reidentify potentially
identifiable personal information received under a data agreement
subject to this Act in violation of this Act with the intent to sell,
transfer, or use personal information obtained under a data
agreement subject to this Act for commercial advantage, personal
gain, or malicious harm is guilty of a felony and shall be fined not
more than [ ] or imprisoned not more than [ ] years, or both.
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(c) F AILURE TO INFORM OFFENSES .—A person who fails to
inform a potential discloser in writing before entering into any data
agreement subject to this Act as required by section 4(8) is guilty
of a misdemeanor and shall be fined not more than [ ].
SEC. 8. CIVIL REMEDIES.
(a) B ENEFICIARIES OF THE AGREEMENT .—An individual who
is the subject of potentially identifiable personal information that is
disclosed pursuant to a data agreement subject to this Act shall be a
third party beneficiary of that data agreement.
(b) L IABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE OF DISCLOSERS AND
RECIPIENTS .—If a discloser or recipient of potentially identifiable
personal information pursuant to a data agreement subject to this
Act fails to exercise reasonable care to prevent the reidentification
of an individual who is the subject of the information, that
individual may bring a civil action against the discloser or recipient
if the individual suffers monetary harm, emotional harm,
reputational harm, or public embarrassment as a result of such
reidentification. Any individual entitled to damages under this
subsection shall recover not less than $1000, and the court may
award reasonable attorney fees and other reasonable litigation costs
to an individual who substantially prevails.
SEC. 9. DUTIES OF [NATIONAL CONSUMER
PROTECTION/PRIVACY AGENCY].
The [National Consumer Protection/Privacy Agency] shall—
(1) make a biennial report summarizing any activities under
this Act [to the national legislature] and post the report on its
public website;
(2) evaluate the operations of the Act and report to [the
national legislature] within five years after the date of enactment of
this Act; and
(3) W ithin six months of the date of enactment, publish one or
more model data agreements.
SEC. 10. OTHER LAWS.
Nothing in this Act changes, overrides, or preempts any
requirement or obligation established by any other law. Nothing in
this Act exempts any person from complying with obligations
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under any applicable law or rule for the protection of human
research subjects.

